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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
EDWARD LEE CROUCH,
Appellant,
vs.

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No.
11913

Respondent ..

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant seeks reversal of a judgment entered in the Seventh District Court, in and for the
County of Carbon, State of Utah, denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and motion to vacate
and set aside judgment.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower Court granted the State's motion to
dismiss both the petition for writ of habeas corpus
and the motion to vacate and set aside the judgment. It is from this order that the appellant now
Prosecutes this appeal.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The respondent prays for an affirmance of th6
lower Court's ruling.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because of the importance of the facts in this
case, the respondent wishes to make his own state1-:ieY'. t of the facts.
In late 1962, appellant was charged with the
crime of second degree burglary. At the hearing
before the committing magistrate he was advised
of his right to counsel pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
77-15-1 (1953). The subsequent preliminary hearing
wa.s continued four (4) times so that he could obtain
counsel (R. 298-300). Ultimately, appellant had a pre·
liminary examination on December 11, 1962. At thal
hearing appellant did not have counsel in that he
had not retained counsel during the continuances;
moreover, he advised the court at the time that he
wished for the hearing to proceed without counsel
(R. 300). Subsequently, he was arraigned, counsel
appointed and tried by a jury which found him guil
ty as charged (R. 369). He was then sentenced to a
term in the Utah State Prison. Appellant appealec
his conviction, but it was dismissed pursuant to
own motion (R. 380).
After appellant was released from the Utah Stati
Prison he went to California where he was picke(
up, charged and convicted of the crime of
sion of a firearm by an ex-felon under Section 1202
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of the California Penal Code (Appellant's Brief pg.

1))
'-' .

In order to de£eat his California conviction apoelbn t filed a writ of habeas corpus and a motion
to vacate and set aside his burglary conviction in
the Seventh District Court, alleging as grounds that
his constitutional rights were violated by reason of
the fact that at his preliminary hearing he was without counsel (R. 3, 4).
The State moved to dismiss the writ and the
motion on the grounds that the State of Utah had no
jurisdiction to entertain the matter (R. 5). On September 91 19691 a hearing was held on the motion to
dismiss (Transcript, Civil No. 9603). Subsequently,
on October 3, 1969, the State's motion to dismiss was
granted and the writ of habeas corpus denied (R. 39).
It is from this order that appellant now prosecutes
this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE APPELLANT'S WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS.

The Utah Const. art. I, § 5 guarantees the right
of habeas corpus in the State of Utah. Thus, djstrict
courts have been given power to .issue writs of
habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdiction"
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-3-4 (1953).
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The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus was
properly stated by Chief Justice Marshall more than
a century ago in Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Peters'!
193 (1830), wherein he said:
,
"The writ of habeas corpus is a high
prerogative writ, known to the common law
the great objective of which is the liberation'
of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause." Id. at 201.

Since the writ is a remedy by which one may chal·
lenge his alleged illegal imprisonment, it follows
that the writ must be directed at the prison officials
enforcing the restraint. As stated by the United
States Supreme Court in Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 48)
(1885):
"A writ of habeas corpus, sued out by one
arrested for crime, is a civil suit or proceeding,
brought by him to assert the civil right of personal liberty, against those who are holding him
in custody as a criminal." Id. at 494 (Emphasis
added.)

Thus, the issue is whether or not the Sevenili
District Court in and for the County of Carbon, State
of Utah, has jurisdictional power to order the Cali·
fornia prison officials to appear and show cause why
appellant's restraint is not illegal. Clearly the Sev·
enth District Court has no such power. Habeas
corpus power in a district court is limited to tha!
court's respective jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann
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78-3-4 (1953); see also, Ahrens v. Clark, Atty Gen., 335

U.S. 188 (1948). The jurisdiction of the Seventh District includes the counties of Sanpete, Carbon,
Emery, Grand and San Juan, Utah Const. art. VIII, §
16, and as a consequence there is no possibility
that there could be jurisdiction vested in the Seventh District regarding the matter now on appeal.
The only Utah case authorizing a court to order
someone out of state to be brought into the state
under habeas corpus authority is Application of Morse,
7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P.2d 773 (1953). In lhat case the
habeas corpus action was for return of a child from
out-of-state custody. The foster parent of the child
was in Utah where he was personally served with
a writ of habeas corpus and ordered to bring the
child before the Utah Court. This Court upheld that
order by saying:
"If a writ of habeas corpus is personally
served within the jurisdiction of the issuing
court upon a person who has the ability to produce the party whose presence is thereby demanded, such writ is effective and binding
even though the party to be produced is held
or detained without the state in which the
court sits." 7 Utah 2d at 315.

There has been no personal service made on
anyone in Utah who has authority to bring the appellant before the Seventh District Court. It is clear
that dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus was
Proper on the grounds that the lower court did not
have jurisdictional power to entertain the petition.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED ANY OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AT HIS PRELIMINARY
HEARING.

It is clear that one accused of a serious crime
is entitled to counsel at all "critical" stages of the
criminal process, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
0961). Therefore, in order for appellant's argumen\
to prevail he must show that under Utah procedure
the preliminary hearing is Jn fact a "critical" stage
of the criminal process. The respondent submits thal
this cannot be done.
In Hamilton, the United States Supreme Court
termed the arraignment proceeding under Alabama
procedure a "critical" stage of the criminal process
because it was at that stage when the accused was
required to plead. 368 U.S. at 54. Following this same
standard the United State Supreme Court in White t'.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) held that under Maryland
procedure the preliminary hearing was a "critical"
stage of the criminal process in that an accused was
entitled to enter a plea at such proceeding. Id., at 60.
However in Pointer v. Texas, 380 (U.S. 400 (1965), the
United States Supreme Court refused to say that the
preliminary hearing under Texas procedure was
"critical" because:
" ... the State informs us that at a Texas
preliminary hearing, such as is involved here,
pleas of guilty or not guilty are not accepted
and that the judge decides only whether the
accused should be bound over to the grand jury
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and if so whether he should be admitted to bail.
Because of these significant differences in the
procedures of the respective states, (Texas vs.
Maryland) we cannot say that the White case
is necessarily controlling as to the right to coun-

sel." Id. at 402 & 403. (Emphasis added.)

The Utah procedure is clearly analagous to the
situation in Pointer regarding the preliminary hearing. In Seibold v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P.2d 289
(1967) this Court said regarding the purpose of a
preliminary hearing:
"A preliminary hearing is the procedure by
which the State puts on sufficient evidence to
convince a committing magistrate that the
crime charged has been committed and that
there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant committed it." 20 Utah 2d at 168.

Moreover, there is no provision requiring or even allowing the accused to plead to a charge at a preliminary hearing, Utah Code Ann. 77-15-9 (1953) and
77-15-34 (1953). In Utah the time for an accused to
plead is at the arraignment, Utah Code Ann. 77-22-13
0953), which procedurally follows the preliminary
hearing. Thus, based on the foregoing United
States Supreme Court cases, it is clear that under
Utah procedure the preliminary hearing is not a
"critical" stage of the criminal process. This Court
has specifically so held in the case of Seibold v. Turner,
supra:

"Under our practice the preliminary hearing is not a critical stage of criminal procedure."
20 Utah 2d at 168. (Emphasis added.)
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See also, State

445 P.2d 926 (Mont. 1968)
Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1968), Ronzzov:
Sigler, 346 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1965), and Sheldon v.
Nebraska, 401 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1968).
v. Olsen,

Since a preliminary hearing is not a "critical"
stage of criminal procedure in Utah it follows tha\
there is no constitutional mandate requiring that an
accused have counsel at such hearing. McGuffey v.
Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967); see also,
Dodge v. State, 20 Utah 2d 48, 432 P.2d 640 (1967).
When one observes the facts of the instant case
it is clear that the appellant was granted every righ\
afforded him under Utah law regarding the preliminary hearing. The minute entry of the committing
magistrate establishes that the appellant was ad·
vised of his right to counsel and a preliminary hear·
ing (R. 298), Utah Code Ann. 77-15-1 (1953); that he
advised the Court he had counsel, but that counsel
was unable to attend on the day set for the hearing
-thus, a continuance was granted (R. 299); that, sub·
sequently, appellant received four (4) more con·
tinuances so that he might obtain counsel (R. 299,
300), Utah Code Ann. 77-15-2 (1953); and, that ulti·
mately he advised the Court that he wished to pro·
ceed with the hearing without counsel (R. 300), Utah
Code Ann. 77-15-3 (1953). In State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87,
228 P. 563 (1924) this Court held that docket entries
as cited above are prima facie evidence of the facts
so stated. 64 Utah at 98 and 99.
The record thus establishes that pursuant to
Utah statutes the appellant received all the rights
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and benefis to which he was entitled, State v. Crank,
105 Utah 332, 342, 142 P.2d 178 (1943). The only deficiency alleged by the appellant is that he did not
have counsel at his preliminary hearing. He makes
no contentions whatever that there was anything
said or done at the hearing which may have prejudiced him (R. 300). His contentions, standing alone,
and without more, are not enough for this Court to
grant his prayer in this case.
In State v. Sullivan, 227 F.2d 511 {10th Cir. 1956),
a case arising out of Utah which is factually similar
to the one now before this Court, the 10th Circuit
held:
"Moreover, petitioners did not enter pleas
of guilty at the preliminary hearing, did not
make confessions, did not testify, and did not
say anything of an incriminating nature. And
in such circumstances, the failure to furnish
them counsel at such hearing did not abridge
their fundamental rights which rendered fatally
infirm their conviction and sentence." Id. at 513.

See also Gallegos v. Cox, 341 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1965).
The appellant also contends that since no transcript of the preliminary hearing was kept that he
was denied due process in that he is unable to show
that he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his alleged right to counsel (appellant's brief, argument 2). At the outset, it is clear that
this contention is without merit in that one cannot
waive a right which he does not initially possess.
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Moreover, Utah Code Ann. 77-15-14 (1953) ffi
quires that testimony at a preliminary hearing mar
only be reduced to writing in "cases of homicide"
or "upon demand of the prosecuting attorney." Suen
conditions were not present in the case now before
this Court. Thus, not only was the appellant not en·
titled to counsel, he was also not entitled to have the
proceedings recorded.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing it is clear that the lower
court properly acted in dismissing appellant's wril
of habeas corpus and motion to vacate and set aside
his former judgment. Thus, the respondent respecl·
fully prays that this Court will affirm the actions ol
the court below.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY

Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY

Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent

